_14_The Use of Scripture in Deciding Doctrinal Controversies

It is a familiar assertion of the Roman Catholic Church that Holy Scripture is incapable of deciding doctrinal issues; hence for the establishment and preservation of unity in teaching the Church needs a visible head (caput visibile), a visible vicar of Christ (vicarium Christi), who will determine by virtue of his personal authority the meaning of the Scriptures. Also modern theology, through its denial of the infallible divine authority of Scripture, has been driven into renouncing the principle of the Christian Church that Scripture is the iudex controversiarum. Neologists have declared with Zoeckler: “With respect to the Bible as normative and judicial authority, the possibility of a merely partial and incomplete settlement of the respective controversy, through the appeal to Scripture, must often be admitted” (Handbuch, 2d ed., III, 151). And Volck of Dorpat said, as we heard: “To inquire of Scripture is not so easy a matter” (op. cit., I, 746).

Scripture teaches the contrary. It requires the teachers of the Church, and in particular also all Christians, to make use of Scripture as iudex controversiarum. For this direction we have the normative example of Christ. When He was tempted to follow after a false faith, he overcame the devil with His “It is written” and obtained the victory by adducing the pertinent Scripture passages. As for the teachers of the Church, it belongs to their office to stop the mouths of the vain talkers (Titus 1:10-11), not, of course, with the fist or similar carnal weapons (2 Cor. 10:3 ff.), but by “holding fast the faithful Word, as he hath been taught” (Titus 1:9), by “holding fast the form of sound words” which they heard and learned from the Apostles (2 Tim. 1:13). Scripture nowhere recognizes either the Roman position that the Scriptures are entirely unsuited to decide controversies or the claim of modern theology that Scripture “often fails” as norm of doctrine. It never fails when wielded by men who are “apt to teach.” And as for the Christians in general, Scripture not only finds that they are competent to judge in matters of Christian doctrine (John 6:45: “They shall be all taught of God”), but impresses upon them the duty of distinguishing between true and false prophets (Matt. 7:15; Rom. 16:17) and to keep a watchful eye on the ministry of their own teachers (Col. 4:17: “And say to Archippus, Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfill it”). And they are to do this not according to the norm of their own thoughts, but are bound to judge, just as their teachers are, by God’s Word (John 8:31-32: “If ye continue in My Word”; 1 Pet. 4:11: “If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God”). It is an established truth of Scripture that all Christians, every one of them, can and should use Scripture as norma doctrinae and as iudex controversiarum. Luther: “The right to judge, and pronounce on, matters of doctrine belongs to each and every Christian, so much so that he is doing an accursed thing who impairs this right by a hairbreadth” (St. L. XIX:341).

To settle a doctrinal controversy, two rules, to which also our old theologians constantly call attention, must be observed. 1) Define exactly the question at issue (status controversiae); and 2) when that has been done, let those Scripture passages speak which treat of the controversial point. Then Scripture itself will decide the matter with the greatest clearness and certainty. It will, of course, not force the external acceptance of its decision and externally stop the mouth of the gainsayer, but it will either inwardly convince and persuade him, as was the case with the servants of the Sanhédrin (John 7:46), or it will confront him who tenaciously clings to his error with the dire possibility of becoming an (Titus 3:11: “knowing that he that is such is subverted and sinneth, being condemned of himself”). Baier’s statement is to the point: “Though Holy Scripture does not force men by external power to acquiesce in its decision according to the , or so that they do not raise any objection by external act, nevertheless since the meaning of Scripture as the divine voice is plain, it is certain that the hearts of men will be convinced according to the , so that they cannot contradict except against the protest of their conscience” (Baier-Walther, I, 186). It is for this reason that Scripture says of Scripture that it speaks, testifies, accuses, judges, concludes under sin, stops the mouth, etc. (John 19:24; Rom. 3:21; John 5:45; 12:48; Gal. 3:22; Rom. 3:19).155

When the Papists raised the objection that Scripture is a “dumb book,” which cannot speak, judge, and decide, our old theologians would answer: Only in the Papacy is the Bible a “dumb book,” because there it is prohibited from speaking (“Scriptura Sacra non muta nisi in papatu, ubi prohibetur loqui”). In addition, they put it up to the Roman theologians, who held Scripture to be God’s Word, why the words of Scripture could not make decisions as well as the words or epistles of the Pope — unless they seriously held that “God’s letter” to mankind (Scripture) had less power than the epistles of the Pope. — With particular vehemence the Roman theologians denounced the Scripture teaching that also “laymen” could and should judge doctrine on the basis of Scripture. They appealed to the Scripture passages which figuratively call the Christians “sheep,” such as John 10:16: “And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold,” and particularly to John 21:16-17, where Christ says to Peter: “Feed My sheep.” Our theologians replied: The Christians are indeed compared to sheep; however, not to foolish sheep, but to wise sheep, that know how to distinguish the voice of Christ from the voice of the stranger and of the pseudo shepherd. John 10:4-5: “When he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him; for they know his voice. And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him; for they know not the voice of strangers.” And v. 27: “My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me.” 156 the chief arguments of Rome against the ability and right of the “laity” to judge doctrine on the basis of Scripture. “Bellarmine objects: ‘The uneducated people cannot judge the doctrine of their shepherds otherwise than by comparing it with the doctrine of their predecessors and the regular shepherds.’ I answer: the example of the Bereans shows that this is wrong; they daily searched the Scriptures, inquiring carefully whether these things were so that were proclaimed by Paul and Barnabas (Acts 17:11); they set up as norm of judgment not the doctrine of the regular shepherds, but the Holy Scriptures, and for this they were commended by the Holy Spirit. The ignorance of the people in the Papacy, of which Bellarmine speaks, arose from the prohibition to read Holy Scripture, for which sacrilege its authors will some day have to give strict account. But we invert Bellarmine’s argument: If the ignorance does not keep them from comparing the doctrine of their shepherds with the doctrine of their predecessors or regular shepherds, it will also not keep them from comparing the doctrine of their shepherds with the doctrine of Christ, the Prophets, and the Apostles, presented in Scripture, and from distinguishing according to this norm the true prophet from the false one. If the former be true, the latter also is true. The major premise is proved by the fact that Christ, the Prophets, and the Apostles can teach and did teach as clearly as the ordinary shepherds. When Christ, the Prophets, and the Apostles performed their ministry of teaching here on earth, they preached not only to the learned, but also to the unlearned, in such a manner that they were understood by all; why, then, should the writings of the Prophets and Apostles be so obscure and perplexing that the unlearned people could not in any way judge from them? Certainly the Prophets and Apostles did not write anything else than they preached viva voce. — ‘But,’ says Bellarmine, ‘if the people could of themselves pass judgment on the doctrine of the shepherd, they would not need preachers.’ I answer: That is an illogical conclusion. Both things are commanded by God; that the people pass judgment on the doctrine of the shepherd — which Bellarmine a while ago in definite words conceded to the people — and that there are to be nevertheless ministers in the Church, ‘they are not all teachers’ (1 Cor. 12:29; Eph. 4:11). It is one thing to inquire into the truth of the doctrine and know the difference between heresy and orthodoxy, between false prophets and true teachers; this is the general call, which belongs to all Christians. It is another thing to teach publicly in the Church; that is the special call. We do not make shepherds of the sheep, but demand that they be and remain sheep; however, we do not want them to be brute sheep, which neither can nor should distinguish between shepherds and wolves. The Papists make of their hearers brute sheep, which follow a shepherd without discretion, not asking whether he leads them to noxious pastures or changes himself into a wolf; they make of the hearers parrots which hang on the nod of the prelates, and of the prelates they make angels, which are infallible and accountable to no one… . The reason which Bellarmine adds is plainly Antichristian: ‘When the appointed shepherd and one who is not called teach things which are contrary to each other, the people should by all means rather follow their shepherd than him who is not a shepherd, even if it should chance that the shepherd erred.’ But it is wrong that the people ought to follow the appointed shepherd when he errs; for this would be nothing else than to command the sheep to follow their shepherd also to noxious pastures, to ask the Christians to prefer darkness to light, error to truth, human regulations to divine authority. Bellarmine indeed submits ‘that it is not credible that God should permit an appointed shepherd so to err that he deceives the simple people.’ But in vain does he argue whether a thing can occur of which it is manifestly certain that it has occurred. He cannot without brazen impudence deny that appointed shepherds have often erred and deceived the simple people. Here we put Bellarmine into a dilemma and ask him whether the people should follow

Since Scripture is plain on the point that all doctrinal issues can and should be decided by Scripture, the question arises why doctrinal debates and colloquies so seldom achieve the desired end. The answer is intimated in the beginning of this chapter. If the status controversiae either is not at all defined — or as happens still oftener — is again lost sight of, the result is that the two parties are talking of two different things, and an agreement is out of the question. Nor can an agreement be reached if the controverted point is not placed in the light of Scripture. This happens when an “interpretation” takes the place of Scripture or passages are quoted which treat of a different doctrine. The latter case is of frequent occurrence. Thus the proposal has been made that the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper be taken not from the words of institution, but from John 6, or that the doctrine of our eternal election to salvation be taken not from the Scripture passages which treat of election, but from John 3:16; etc. Modern theology even goes so far as to demand that each doctrine be derived from “the whole of Scripture.” This senseless and impossible method, recommended and adopted by the “Reformer of the nineteenth century” (Schleiermacher), is declared to proceed from a “deeper understanding of Scripture,” while the old theologians are said to have cut up Scripture by insisting that each doctrine be taken from the passages in which it is revealed. It is clear that in all these cases Scripture is not heard at all, but its mouth is stopped by a principle foreign to Scripture, exactly as is done in the Papacy. Any agreement in cases like these is, of course, out of the question. This subject will be taken up again in the chapter “Holy Scripture and Exegesis.”