b. POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES

1. Life (Vita)

God alone has life in an absolute sense. Creatures also have life, but it is a derived life, a life in God (Acts 17:28). God, however, has life in Himself (John 5:26). The Scriptures call God the “living God” to set forth the majesty of the one true God in contrast to the pagan idols, who are only vanities (Joshua 3:10; Jer. 10:10; Acts 14:15), and in contrast to all created life, which has its origin in God, for He “giveth to all life and breath” (Acts 17:25).

According to Scripture the fact that God is the living God is a warning for the godless, for “it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God” (Heb. 10:31). But for the believers it is a comforting fact. The covenant people of the Old Testament, standing on the brink of Jordan, witnessed that God is indeed a living God (Josh. 3:10), and the New Testament Church as “the Church of the living God” (1 Tim. 3:15) places its trust in the living God (1 Tim. 4:10). In days of disaster and despair the Christian exclaims with Luther: “Vivit!”

2. The Knowledge of God (Scientia Dei)

Knowledge is an attribute common to both God and man. The heathen know God’s righteousness, judgment, Law, for the work of the Law is written into their hearts (Rom. 1:32; 2:15). The Christian knows that he is not justified by the deeds of the Law, but only through faith in Jesus Christ (Gal. 2:16). Knowledge is an attribute of the evil and the good angels. The devils know a great many things: that there is a God; that Christ is God’s Son; that an eternal doom awaits them (James 2:19; Mark 5:12; Matt. 8:29). The knowledge of the good angels is immense. They know “the manifold wisdom of God according to the eternal purpose in Christ” (Eph. 3:10-11). They place their intelligence into the service of the Christian Church. (Heb. 1:14; 1 Pet. 1:12; Matt. 4:11; Luke 16:22; Matt. 13:30, 39, 49.)

The knowledge of creatures is relative, imperfect. God’s knowledge is absolute, perfect. The knowledge of God differs from that of creatures in two points: in its extent and in its manner.

a. God’s knowledge is omniscience (John 21:17; 1 John 3:20) and comprises all things. It includes all future events, which are hidden to creatures and known only to God (praescientia) (Is. 41:22-23), and even the contingent events, as whether the people of Keilah would deliver David to Saul if he remained there (1 Sam. 23:12); what would have happened to Sodom if it had seen the miracles which Christ performed in Capernaum (Matt. 11:23). (Scientia de futuro conditionata.)82

b. Man’s knowledge is acquired. He progresses from the known to the unknown and from one known fact to another. God’s knowledge is not acquired, for He knows all things in one, simple, all-comprehensive act. Man acquires his knowledge mediately, for he can learn the nature of things only by a process of perception, induction, deduction, based on a study of observable characteristics and actions of the objects. God, however, knows and discerns the inner nature, the inherent essence of all objects directly and immediately. The old dogmaticians put it thus: “God discerns objects not by means of comprehensible characteristics (per species intelligibiles), but in their very nature and being. Man looks at things (adspicit); God sees through them (perspicit).”

Scripture therefore tells us that God knows the thoughts of men even though they do not reveal these thoughts by actions, words, or attitude. God knows the hearts of all the children of men (1 Kings 8:39); He is the true (Acts 15:8); Christ sees () the thoughts of men (Matt. 9:4) and knows what is in man (John 2:25).

What Scripture teaches concerning God’s knowledge serves for our warning and comfort. It is the prerogative of the Divine Majesty alone to know future events (Is. 41:22-23). All who consult fortunetellers and necromancers (spiritualistic mediums, palm-readers, astrologers) transfer God’s glory to men and devils. They are an abomination to God and a curse to their country and were therefore put to death under the Old Testament theocracy (Deut. 18:9 ff.; Lev. 20:6, 27). It is furthermore the prerogative of God alone to know what is in God. “No man knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him” (Matt. 11:27). All who teach otherwise and consent not to the wholesome words of Christ (1 Tim. 6:3), but make their own reason or religious experience the source and standard of truth, dismiss the only competent Teacher in the Church and usurp His prerogatives. God warns against these self-appointed teachers: “Hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy unto you; they make you vain; they speak a vision of their own heart and not out of the mouth of the Lord” (Jer. 23:16). And, finally, we are all only too prone to forget that the all-wise God knows all our thoughts, words, and deeds and that the darkness cannot hide us from Him, for “the night shineth as the day, and darkness and light are both alike to Him” (Ps. 139:12).

But Scripture shows us also how to employ God’s omniscience for our comfort in spiritual and physical needs. God knows those who have a contrite heart, who tremble at His Word (Is. 66:2), and He delights to dwell with them in His grace (Is. 57:15; Ps. 34:18; 51:17). Our heavenly Father knows our physical wants and needs (Matt. 6:32). He knows the righteousness of our cause when the enemies of the truth malign and persecute us (Ps. 17:3).

A number of problems confront the philosopher who attempts to analyze the omniscience of God. The most vexing problem is: What is the relation of the infallible prescience of God to human freedom and responsibility? If there is an infallible foreknowledge of God, then everything must happen as God has foreknown it. If that is true, then there can be no human freedom of action and, of course, no human responsibility. This is the position of some pagan philosophers,83 of the Socinians,84 as well as some modern theologians. They have denied God’s omniscience entirely, at least in reference to the wicked deeds of men.

In answering this problem Scripture teaches us to observe three things:

1. God’s prescience extends over all things and is infallible. Everything happens as God has foreknown it. The opposite assumption would abolish the true conception of God.85

2. Though the omniscience of God extends over all things without exception, it is not the efficient cause of the things which it knows. In the light of Scripture, when God views a thing abstractly (notionaliter), He always views it as already existing. Thus we read in Ps. 139:1-4: “O Lord, Thou hast searched me and known me. Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising; Thou understandest my thought afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways, for there is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, O Lord, Thou knowest it altogether.” When God through His messenger announces to the Laodicean congregation that He knows its works, that it is neither cold nor hot (Rev. 3:15), this divine knowledge does not effect the sad conditions at Laodicea, but views them as already existing. In describing God’s omniscience the Formula of Concord says very correctly: “The foreknowledge of God (praescientia) foresees and foreknows also that which is evil; however, not in such a manner as though it were God’s gracious will that it should happen… . However, the beginning and cause of evil is not God’s foreknowledge (for God does not create and effect [or work] evil, neither does He help or promote it): but the wicked, perverse will of the devil and of men [is the cause of evil].” (Trigl. 1065, 6-7.) And the Epitome: “For the foreknowledge of God is nothing else than that God knows all things before they happen.” (Trigl. 833, 3.)

But there is also a knowledge on the part of God which is causative. It differs from the omniscience in two respects: This unique and special knowledge extends over only a certain definite number of objects, not over all things, good and evil; and second, it causes and effects the object of God’s foreknowledge. It was this knowledge which selected Israel as the chosen race (“You only have I known of all the families of the earth,” Amos 3:2); which converted the Galatians, who were “known of God” (Gal. 4:9). This is the so-called nosse cum affectu et effectu or the “pregnant” use of the term “to know.” 86

3. There seems to be an irreconcilable contradiction between the first and the second statement, even when we define “God’s foreknowledge as nothing else than that God knows all things before they occur” (Formula of Concord). Can we maintain God’s infallible foreknowledge and also human freedom and responsibility? Reason argues, if it is true — as indeed it is true — that all things must happen as God has foreseen them, then we must either join Cicero, the Socinians, et alii and sacrifice the infallible and absolute omniscience or become Stoics and deny the freedom of hu an action and man’s responsibility for his sin. But on the basis of Scripture we must maintain both, even though in this life we cannot harmonize the apparent contradictions. The Formula of Concord suggests the only possible mode of procedure: 1) We must firmly believe that everything must happen as God has foreknown it; 2) We dare not trouble ourselves with what God may have foreknown concerning ourselves and others, because we would then enter the realm of the unrevealed and inscrutable mysteries of God. 3) We must use the means of grace to which God has directed us. “Thus there is no doubt that God most exactly and certainly foresaw [praeviderit] before the time of the world, and still knows, which of those that are called will believe or will not believe; also which of the converted will persevere [in faith] and which will not persevere; which will return after a fall [into grievous sins], and which will fall into obduracy [will perish in their sins]. So, too, the number, how many there are of these on either side, is beyond all doubt perfectly known to God. However, since God has reserved this mystery for His wisdom, and has revealed nothing concerning it to us in His Word, much less commanded us to investigate it with our thought, but has earnestly discouraged us therefrom, Rom. 11:33 ff., we should not reason in our thoughts, draw conclusions, nor inquire curiously into these matters, but should adhere to His revealed Word, to which He points us.” (Trigl. 1081, 54 f.) This practice is not a “scientific” solution of the problem. But is it not more scientific frankly to admit one’s ignorance than to deceive oneself and others with a counterfeit solution or with the impossible promise of a final solution after further exploration? 87

A second problem is stated as follows: Since there is no past or future with God, how can we speak of God’s praescientia? Answer: God ascribes prescience to Himself (Is. 46:10), but He does so to conform to our mode of thinking. Being in time and subject to its laws of temporal sequence, we cannot conceive of timelessness, of God’s eternal “today,” of an ever-present moment. We think only in terms of the past, the present, the future, and therefore God condescends to our concepts of time. In this sense He with whom there is no future ascribes to Himself a knowledge which in distinction from all human wisdom extends also to future events.88

Finally, the question is frequently asked whether foreknowledge may not also be ascribed to man, his disembodied spirit, and angels. The Scriptural answer is a definite no. Foreknowledge is the exclusive property of the divine Majesty. Furthermore, Scripture expressly affirms that man does not know the future; for example, the time of the Last Judgment (Matt. 24:36). When men, as Daniel (Dan. 2:27-28, 45), or angels, as Gabriel (Luke 1:19), foretold future events, they did so by a special revelation for a specific purpose. Man’s so-called prophecies are at best conjecture or a prognostication based on calculations. Fortunetellers who claim to foretell the future are the mediums of the devils, for the good angels will never become guilty of such a blasphemous encroachment upon God’s prerogative.

3. The Wisdom of God (Sapientia Dei)

Scripture makes a distinction between God’s wisdom and His knowledge, Rom. 11:33 (, “the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God”). The two words are not synonymous when applied to God. From God’s viewpoint there is no distinction between the various divine attributes, for they constitute His indivisible essence itself. Since the human mind cannot comprehend God in His absolute unity, God reveals Himself for our sake in separate attributes. This fact compels us to differentiate also between wisdom and knowledge, especially in view of the fact that … not only co-ordinate, but also differentiate the and the . Likewise in 1 Cor. 12:8 a distinction is made between the two gifts of the Holy Spirit: and . In Scripture the term wisdom — sapientia, — denotes a practical knowledge,89 the ability to discern correctly the best ends and choose the best means for attaining these ends. And in this sense, Scripture ascribes wisdom to God. God reveals this wisdom not only in the realm of nature by the acts of creation and preservation (Ps. 104:24), but also in the realm of grace by His counsel and acts concerning our salvation. The Gospel of Christ Crucified is expressly called , the “wisdom of God,” the “hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory.” (1 Cor. 2:6 ff.)

Since God is the “only wise God” (1 Tim. 1:17; Rom. 16:27) and since man is totally unable to fathom the depths of His unsearchable wisdom (Rom. 11:33), we dare never criticize God’s wisdom, but must stand before it in adoration and praise. By nature we are only too prone to criticize God in His works and to elevate our own puny wisdom above God’s unsearchable wisdom. This is true particularly of liberal theology, where a carping and censorious spirit — under the pretense of a scientifically critical method — has gained complete control. Modern theologians challenge God’s wisdom especially a) in their claim that Scripture is not the inviolable truth of God, and b) in the rejection of the Vicarious Atonement as too mechanical, juridical, as unethical and even detrimental to morals.90 Because of the old Adam even the Christian at times criticizes the ways of God. But in spite of the Modernist and the old Adam in the Christian, the Scriptural truth cannot be challenged that not only in a general way, but in every detail everything in this world is taking the right course. It cannot be otherwise, for all things are controlled by the expert hand of the all-wise God. (). This includes also all the punishments, e. g., famines, wars, depressions, earthquakes, floods, with which God allows mankind to be afflicted (Gen. 3:16ff.; Matt. 24:1ff.). They must serve God’s gracious purpose and will to bring men to repentance and faith, as Christ expressly teaches on the basis of concrete examples in Luke 13:1 ff.

4. The Attributes of the Divine Will

The Scriptures ascribe to God not only mind (Rom. 11:34: “Who hath known the mind of the Lord”), but also will (1 Tim. 2:4: “who will have all men to be saved”; John 6:40; 1 Thess. 4:3: the will of God concerning our salvation and our sanctification). The remaining positive attributes may be viewed as being related to God’s will and include His holiness, justice, truth, power, benevolence, mercy, love, grace, and long-suffering.

Before we discuss the various attributes of God’s will, two questions must be answered: 1) Do causes influence God‘s will? 2) Is a classification of the divine will permissible?

1. The first question must be answered as follows: a) Scripture, on the one hand, describes God in His majesty. As the God of majesty He is independent of all things, is absolute and unconditioned (Rom. 11:36: “Of Him and through Him and to Him are all things”). It is therefore impossible to ascribe to God in His majesty cause and effect as two separate and distinct concepts. Non sunt in Deo causae formaliter causantes, b) Scripture, on the other hand, compels us to make a distinction between cause and effect in God, because we are unable to comprehend the absolute God. Scripture therefore teaches us to view God’s wrath as being caused by man’s sin (Ps. 90:7-8; Jer. 2:19) and God’s grace as resting upon Christ’s merit (Rom. 3:24: “through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus”). In Deo sunt causae virtualiter causantes.91

2. There can be no division and classification of God’s will as far as God’s essence is concerned. In Him there is only one will, and this is identical with His essence. But because of our finite comprehension Scripture itself teaches us to observe the following classification and divisions.

a. We distinguish between God’s first, or antecedent, and second, or consequent, will (voluntas prima, sive antecedens, et voluntas secunda, sive consequens). According to John 3:17 we must first think of God as not willing to condemn a single person, but that He earnestly wills the salvation of everyone. Then we must secondly think of God that He wills the condemnation of all who reject Christ, for in v. 18 we read: “He that believeth not is condemned already.” The distinction between the antecedent and the consequent will has been misused in the interest of synergism since Chrysostom’s days. But we must maintain this distinction because it is Scriptural and because Calvinism denies it by ascribing to God in His relation to lost mankind two independent and contradictory wills.

b. We must distinguish between an irresistible and a resistible will in God (voluntas irresistibilis et voluntas resistibilis). God in His majesty cannot be resisted. No one can resist Christ’s will which will summon all men before the Judgment throne. There is a divine “must” () behind this will (John 5:28; Matt. 25:31 ff.; 2 Cor. 5:10: “We must [] appear”). But Christ’s will to bring men to faith through the preaching of the Gospel can be resisted (Matt. 23:37: “Ye would not”). This distinction has been misused by ancient and modern synergists, who argue that the ability to resist implies the ability to assist and who therefore ascribe to the natural man facultas se applicandi ad gratiam, self-determination.

c. God wills immediately and mediately (voluntas absoluta et voluntas ordinata). At Cana, Christ made wine without employing the usual means for making wine (John 2:1-11). In exceptional cases, so-called reserved cases, God works immediately even in the Kingdom of Grace, as is evident from the fact that John was endowed with the Holy Ghost in his mother’s womb (Luke 1:15, 41). But God’s usual order is that He works faith, preservation of faith, sanctification, etc., only through the means of grace which He has appointed and to which He has bound us (Rom. 10:17; Titus3:5; 1 Pet. 1:23 ff.; Mark 16:15; Matt. 28:19-20). When “enthusiasts” appeal to Luke 1:15, they misapply this text. “Enthusiasm” in all its forms perverts the divine order.

d. God’s will is unconditioned by any human effort as well as conditioned by human efforts (voluntas gratiae et voluntas conditionata). In the realm of grace, God’s will is not contingent upon man’s good works, for man is saved by grace without the deeds of the Law (Rom. 3:28), by grace alone (Eph. 2:8-10; Rom. 11:6). All who endeavor to supplement the will of grace by human effort will receive the curse (Gal. 3:10). In the realm of the Law, however, God’s will is conditioned by man’s work. “This do, and thou shalt live” (Luke 10:28; Gal. 3:12). But let no one who hopes to be saved in this way forget that the will of God is conditioned by nothing less than a perfect fulfillment of the entire Law, for “cursed is everyone that continueth not in all things which are written in the Book of the Law to do them” (Gal. 3:10).

e. Scripture distinguishes between God’s revealed and His hidden will (voluntas revelata, voluntas signi, and voluntas abscondita, voluntas beneplaciti). On the one hand, Christians know God’s will; they know “the things that are freely given us of God,” “they judge all things” and “know the mind of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:12, 15-16). On the other hand, it is also true that no man “knows the mind of the Lord” (Rom. 11:33-34). In all matters of their salvation men are directed solely to the gracious will of God, which is revealed in Christ and clearly taught in all those passages which tell us that God can and will be known only in Christ (John 1:18; Matt. 17:5; John 6:40) and that salvation can be found only in Christ (Matt. 11:28). Theologians find fault with Luther because he first makes a distinction between the hidden and the revealed wills of God, and then in matters of salvation completely ignores the hidden will, since it is unsearchable, and directs our attention solely to the revealed will. This procedure, they say, is an act of violence in the realm of reason (Gewaltakt).92 The fact is that Luther’s procedure is that of the Scriptures (1 Cor. 2:12, 15-16; Rom. 11:33-34).93

We are now ready to discuss the positive attributes of God that may be viewed as relating to God’s will.

a. The Holiness of God (Sanctitas Dei)

The holiness of God denotes 1) God’s supreme majesty and absolute transcendence. The basic meaning of in the Trisagion (Is. 6:3) is separate, removed, exalted. God is the Holy One (Is. 43: 3, 14; etc.), the absolutely Remote. Though He permeates and fills all things, He is exalted above all creatures, sits upon a throne, high and lifted up, before whom the seraphim cover their face and feet. The New Testament equivalent of (John 12:41). In its first meaning the holiness of God describes God in His essence and therefore includes all His attributes.94 The “Holy One of Israel” and “the God of Israel” are unequivocal synonyms (Ps. 71:22). 2) The term holiness denotes also the absolute ethical purity of God. As the holy God He is separate from sin, and His holiness includes His contrast and opposition to man’s sin. “Be ye holy, for I am holy” (1 Pet. 1:16; cp. Lev. 11:44-45; 19:2; 20:7). Isaiah was fully conscious of the fact that the revelation of God’s holiness brought God’s absolute purity into sharp contrast with his own and his people’s sin. (V. 5: “Woe is me! for I am undone,” etc.) Modern theology denies in part or in whole this twofold definition of God’s holiness.95

The revelation of God’s holiness teaches us two important lessons. In the first place, we must enter into His presence with deep awe and great reverence. Jehovah’s throne is an awe-full throne, before which we are, as Abraham said, nothing but dust and ashes. (Gen. 18:27 ff.) But, secondly, we can come into His presence with confidence and joy, because the holiness of God has been perfectly appeased through Christ’s vicarious atonement (Rom. 5:1, 10; Eph. 3:11-12).

b. The Justice of God (Iustitia Dei)

The Scriptures ascribe justice to God and thereby exclude all unrighteousness from God’s being, Ps. 92:15 (“The Lord is upright, and there is no unrighteousness in Him”), and especially Deut. 32:4, which abounds in predicates denoting justice (“He is the Rock, His work is perfect, for all His ways are judgment; a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is He”).

If we attempt to comprehend God’s righteousness according to our mode of thinking, we encounter an insurmountable difficulty. Man is just when his actions conform to the Law of his divine Superior. But since God has no superior and therefore no fixed norm, can we really predicate righteousness of Him? This apparent difficulty is resolved in the Scriptural axiom coined by the Scholastics and used by Luther: Deus est exlex. God is outside the Law. “He is just, because He wills and does everything in conformity with His own Law.” Luther: “God issues His Law to others, but He does not apply it as a norm to Himself.96

In its relation to man God’s justice is 1) iustitia legalis, the divine righteousness revealed in the Law, and 2) iustitia evangelica, the righteousness revealed in the Gospel. The former is legislative, inasmuch as it is the standard for man’s moral being and actions and demands absolute conformity with this norm (Matt. 22:37); it is remunerativa, inasmuch as it rewards the good; and it is vindicativa (punitiva, ultrix), inasmuch as it punishes the evil (2 Thess. 1:4-10). The iustitia evangelica is the very opposite. It consists in God’s setting aside His iustitia legalis (), declaring the sinner righteous, forgiving his sin by grace for the sake of Christ’s righteousness (Rom. 3:21-22: “The righteousness of God without the Law is manifested … the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ”). Man’s salvation rests solely on the iustitia evangelica, and faith in this “evangelical justice” constitutes the essence of Christianity. — Here we have the answer to the question whether God punishes sin adequately. According to Gal. 3:13; John 3:36, etc., Christ bore the adequate punishment of sin in our place, and whoever rejects this full and complete payment must pay it himself eternally.

c. The Truthfulness of God (Veracitas Dei)

Men put little faith in what God says. They believe neither God’s threats in the Law (Ps. 90:11) nor His promises in the Gospel (Is. 53:1; John 12:38). But this distrust and disbelief frustrates God’s gracious purpose to save man. Therefore God does not hesitate to assure us in His Word that He is not a liar like men, but the absolute truth. Rom. 3:4: “Let God be true, but every man a liar.” According to God’s record man’s veracity score is zero. Not only does Scripture characterize some peoples and persons as past masters at lying, e. g., the Cretans (Titus 1:12), but Christ declares that the whole human race is inherently dishonest, deceitful, mendacious. Out of the heart, the inner being, proceed false witnesses and blasphemies (Matt. 15:19). And David states: “All men are liars” (Ps. 116:11). Over against this universal dishonesty of man, Scripture repeatedly places the absolute truthfulness of God into the sharpest possible antithesis (Titus 1:2: ; John 3:33: ; Heb. 6:18: ; 1 Sam. 15:29; Num. 23:19). — God’s words can therefore never pass away (Matt. 24:35); John 10:35: “The Scripture cannot be broken.”

The absolute truthfulness of God in His wrath as well as in His grace should, on the one hand, arouse men from their carnal security, for God will not be mocked (Gal. 6:7) and, on the other hand, incite them to trust God’s gracious promises unconditionally (Rom. 10:11; Titus 1:2: “Eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised.”)

d. The Power of God (Potentia Dei)

The power of God differs from the power of creatures both in the manner and in the extent of its activity. Concerning the mode, Scripture teaches us to say that God effects His works by an act of the will.97 God creates by His will, by His fiat (Gen. 1:3). God’s will is God’s power; what He wills, He does (Ps. 115:3). In regard to the extent of God’s power the Scriptures say that “with God all things are possible” (Matt. 19:26), or, stated more emphatically in a double negative, “With God nothing shall be impossible” (Luke 1:37). God is omnipotent. How foolish to entertain the pantheistic and rationalistic idea that in the work of creation God exhausted His power and reached the limit of His creative capacity! But it is just as foolish when men take the liberty to determine not only what God’s omnipotence may do, but also what it actually has done. God’s Word alone answers that question, and man has no right to say that God in His omnipotence forgives sin without the Vicarious Atonement, because He has revealed to us that we have forgiveness only in Christ’s redemption (Rom. 3:24).

Whatever God wills He accomplishes in one of two ways: either by His appointed means (causae secundae, potentia ordinata) or without them (potentia absoluta, immediata). In either case, however, the one and selfsame divine power is operative. The same divine omnipotence is at work when God according to His established order sustains life by food and drink or immediately, as He sustained Moses for forty days without meat or drink (Ex. 34:28). “Thou feedest us from year to year” (Hymn 569:8). All those works which God performs without employing the usual means (causae secundae) are defined in Scriptures as miracles (John 2:11: ; Acts 2:43: ). Two points must be observed in considering miracles: 1) God is not bound to observe the distinction between potentia absoluta and ordinata; in other words, He can do without means what He ordinarily does through means (Ex. 34:28). God is above the laws of nature and can therefore dispense with them at will, as Christ teaches: “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God” (Matt. 4:4). Strictly speaking, there are no immutably fixed laws of nature. They exist only in the foolish minds of mechanistic philosophers and evolutionistic theorizers. In reality the laws of nature are nothing more than the will of God as applied to the creature. 2) God has bound us to the appointed means. We shall leave the performance of miracles to God. Of course, there is a miracle working faith (Wunderglaube, fides heroica, Matt. 17:20; 21:21; 1 Cor. 12:1, 10) which is not bound to rules. He that has this gift knows when to use it.98

The objection that God is not omnipotent because He cannot die, lie, steal, etc., does not emanate from genuine motives, such as spiritual afflictions or an honest quest for the truth. In the final analysis the objection is nothing but a sophistical denial of God’s essence, in which will and power are one. It does not merit refutation.99

e. God’s Goodness, Mercy, Love, Grace, Long-suffering, Patience (Bonitas, Misericordia, Amor, Gratia, Longanimitas, Patientia Dei)

The close relation of these attributes makes it advisable to treat them under one heading.100

On the basis of Scriptures the dogmaticians distinguish between the objective and subjective goodness of God. Viewed objectively, goodness is that quality in God whereby He is the absolute Good, the unconditioned and essential Perfection. Scripture ascribes goodness to creatures not only before the Fall (Gen. 1:31: “very good”), but also after the Fall (1 Tim. 4:4: “Every creature of God is good”). But creatures are good only in so far as they are God’s creation. God alone is good of Himself and in Himself (), and in this sense “there is none good but One, that is, God” (Matt. 19:17). God’s goodness and absolute perfection are the same. Gerhard: “God is really good, He alone is good, and He is the cause of all goodness” (Loci, locus “De Nat. Dei,” § 208).101

There is a very important lesson in the truth that God alone is good in Himself, whereas all human goodness is only a derived goodness. This truth will guard us against pride when we observe special gifts in ourselves not bestowed on others, and against envy when the situation is reversed. Scripture and experience teach us that pride and envy have always been the great troublemakers in the Church and in the State. Scripture warns against pride (1 Cor. 4:7) and against envy (1 Pet. 2:1). Gerhard: “All good gifts come down to us and our neighbors from God. Whoever therefore is envious of the neighbor has a quarrel with God, the Giver of the gifts, and is in reality a [one who picks a fight with God].” (Op. cit., § 215).

God’s goodness is not only “remote,” “objective,” an attribute within the divine essence, but it is also “subjective,” “relative,” an attribute which describes God’s benevolence and beneficence toward His creatures.102 Scripture contains many references concerning God’s goodness toward all creatures, rational and irrational: The Lord is good to all (Ps. 145:9), has pity even on animals (Jonah 4:11), helps both man and beast (Ps. 36:6); and especially Psalm 136, with its refrain: “For His mercy endureth forever.” For this reason the Psalmist calls on all creatures to praise God (Psalm 148).

But Scripture focuses our attention in particular on God’s goodness toward man, more specifically, toward man as a sinner. It does so by using the terms mercy, love, grace, patience, long-suffering. These terms are, of course, synonyms, inasmuch as they all describe God’s goodness. But from our viewpoint they present various aspects of God’s goodness, and these synonymous terms bring God’s goodness into full view, just as the various facets refract and reflect the brilliance of the diamond.

The mercy of God is goodness as compassion upon man, whose sin has brought him into untold misery. “Through the tender mercy of God [] … the Dayspring [Christ] hath visited us, to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death” (Luke 1:78-79). The love of God shows us that facet of God’s goodness which reveals Him as being deeply attached to sinful mankind and anxious to restore men to communion with God, John 3:16 God is the Philanthropist, whose love toward man () has appeared, Titus 3:4. The grace of God is goodness in so far as man in no wise has deserved it, but God is good toward the sinner only for the sake of Christ’s vicarious satisfaction (Titus 3:5: “Not by works of righteousness which we have done”; Rom. 3:24: “freely, by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus”). The terms patience and long-suffering reveal that phase of God’s goodness which prompts Him not to punish immediately, but to wait for the sinner’s repentance. He waited for 120 years before the Flood (1 Pet. 3:20), and the postponement of the world’s final Judgment is due not to God’s slackness, but to His long-suffering, which earnestly desires that all should come to repentance (2 Pet. 3:9). God characterizes Himself as “the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth” (Ex. 34:6).103

The repeated occurrence of great catastrophes, such as earthquakes, floods, wars, panics, is viewed by some as denying God’s goodness. But these ravages are employed by God in the interest of His saving goodness. They are a call to repentance to all men (Luke 13:3, 5). Therefore we observe a day of penitence after such catastrophes. Unfortunately the vast majority remains impenitent and compels God to complain: “Why should ye be stricken any more? Ye will revolt more and more; the whole head is sick, and the whole heart is faint” (Is. 1:5).

God’s goodness must be reflected in His children. “Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Luke 6:36). Christians are taught of God to love one another (1 Thess. 4:9). They love, bless, help, and intercede for their enemies that they may be children of their heavenly Father (Matt. 5:44-45). They are kind to one another, forgiving, tender-hearted, even as God for Christ’s sake has forgiven them (Eph. 4:32; Col. 3:13). God’s goodness toward the dumb creatures must also reflect itself in the Christian, for “a righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies [“the heart”: marginal reading] of the wicked are cruel” (Prov. 12:10).

Among all the attributes of God, Scripture assigns a unique place to God’s goodness as grace in Christ. We must always keep in mind that the true scope of the Bible is none other than to reveal God’s grace. For Scripture reveals Christ the Savior of sinners, and in Christ’s redemptive work God turns His gracious countenance toward sinners. “For God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved” (John 3:17). Also the Old Testament has no other scope than to reveal the forgiveness of sins in Christ, i. e., God’s grace, as St. Peter testifies: “To Him give all the Prophets witness that through His name whosoever believeth in Him shall receive remission of sins” (Acts 10:43). If Scripture had revealed all the divine attributes except God’s grace, then Scripture would be of no value to us. Our knowledge of God would fill our hearts with terror if Scripture had not revealed that the one, indivisible, immutable, infinite, omnipresent, eternal, living, all-knowing, all-wise, omnipotent, holy, just, truthful God is also the gracious God — gracious in Christ and for Christ’s sake. “All sins Thou borest for us, Else had despair reigned o’er us.” This is God’s true countenance.

Let us take heed lest we deface God’s gracious countenance. Rome defaces it in a very coarse way by coldly making the doctrine of work-righteousness its central doctrine and by expressly pronouncing the anathema on the doctrine of justification through faith in God’s grace for Christ’s sake.104 In the Papacy, God’s gracious countenance is transformed into the countenance of an angry judge. Luther complains that as a result of the papal system of work-righteousness he had feared Christ more than the devil. — God’s gracious countenance is distorted also in some sections of the Protestant Church, though not so patently as in Rome, yet just as seriously. Calvinism emphasizes the sovereignty of God in such a one-sided manner that the countenance of grace is virtually obliterated. Synergism, ancient and modern, in so far as it makes man’s salvation depend on some good quality in man, thereby actually places the mask of a cruel and vindictive judge over the loving face of our gracious Father. — The same is done by the modern theologians who deny the satisfactio vicaria.105 But only too often even Christians who clearly understand the doctrine of God’s grace and are also able to state it correctly, deface God’s gracious countenance. This occurs when they attempt to determine God’s gracious attitude toward themselves on the basis of their subjective feelings and emotions and not on the basis of the objective Word of God.106

In concluding our discussion of the doctrine of God we must once more point out that all who deny the Holy Trinity know nothing of God’s gracious countenance. If there is no Trinity, then there is no eternal Son of God, no incarnation of the Son of God in the fullness of time, no Vicarious Atonement, no justification by faith, no peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ; then there is only the Law, with its obligations, demands, threats, and curses. The Triune God is the gracious God — and the gracious God is the Triune God.

1 Concerning the use of : The New Testament employs to denote the cause or source from which something is known, as in Matt. 7:16: “By their fruits () ye shall know them”; and also as a temporal preposition, as in Matt. 19:4: “Which made them at () the beginning.” Luther takes in the first sense: “an der Schoepfung der Welt.” We accept Luther’s rendition because it fits well into the context, and classical Greek suggests it, as, for example, Aristotle. The exegetes are not agreed.

2 De Mundo, cap. VI.

3 Deum non vides, tamen Deum agnoscis ex operibus eins. Tuscul. Disputt. I, 28.

4 For other proofs for the existence of God see Baier-Walther, I, p. 26 ff.

5 Speaking of the value of the Natural Law and warning against identifying it absolutely with the written Law, the Decalog, Chemnitz enumerates the following points: 1) Paul discusses this matter ex professo in Romans 1 and 2 and ascribes honorable terms to the Natural Law. He calls it God’s truth (Rom. 1:18); God’s manifestation (v. 19); God’s judgment (v. 32); the work of the Law written into the heart at man’s very creation (Rom. 2:15). And even the term lex naturae is taken from Scriptures: “The Gentiles do by nature the things of the Law” (Rom. 2:14). And we gratefully acknowledge the blessing that God did not permit the light of the Law to be totally extinguished through the Fall, but wanted certain remnants of it to remain, so that among men there might be a political society in which God through the Gospel could gather His Church. The terms employed by Paul show that these remnants are indeed to be considered highly. 2) The comparison between the natural and the written Law has the useful purpose of teaching us to respect and praise all those pronouncements which philosophers, poets, historians, legislators, etc., made on moral issues and which agree with the Natural Law, for they are the divine right and the divinely revealed truth of God. Paul does not hesitate to quote even in a most important theological discussion the pagan author Menander’s sentence: “Evil communications corrupt good manners” (1 Cor. 15:33). 3) It is also helpful to the end that we recognize the testimony of the conscience in the unregenerate as a genuine testimony, lest man deaden the accusing thoughts (Rom. 2:15) under the pretense that the testimony of the conscience is an empty fantasy, causing worry only to women, whereas in reality it is the judgment of God convicting man of his sin. 4) The comparison of the unwritten with the written Law enables us to observe in which points the natural knowledge of the Law is obscured, where the judgment is corrupt, and which acts, both good and evil, are unknown to reason and revealed only in the Law. (Loci, II, 103 f.; ed. Viteb.)

6 Chemnitz: “What is the natural knowledge, what is its character, its extent, and its efficacy? Strictly speaking, it is non-existent, or imperfect, or inactive. It is non-existent, because in the entire realm of philosophy there is no knowledge whatsoever of the gracious promise of the forgiveness of sin. This has been revealed to the Church by the Son of God, who is in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 1:21; 2:7). – It is imperfect, because the Gentiles knew only a part of the Law. Concerning the worship of the heart commanded in the First Table, reason knows nothing definite; at best, the heathen philosophers can give some instructions concerning outward conduct. It is inactive, for although the knowledge that there is a God, and that He prescribes an obedience which carefully distinguishes between good and evil, is inscribed in the human heart, nevertheless man’s assent to this knowledge is not only weak, but is frequently suppressed entirely by horrible doubt. This fact is exemplified in Tuscul., where Cicero, in a discussion on the immortality of the soul, says to Anthony: ‘Examine carefully Plato’s book concerning the soul; you can find nothing better.’ Anthony answered: ‘I have often done it. But I cannot understand that while I am reading it, I agree; and when I lay it aside and begin to meditate concerning the immortality of the soul, all assent disappears.’ ” (Op. cit., I, 20 sq.)

7 Gerhard in Loci, locus “De Natura Dei,” § 63, lists those who err in defectu: the Socinians, who in denying that the first man was created in the image of God naturally deny that remnants of the divine image remain in fallen man; Flacius, who held that no true rudiments of the knowledge of God remain in man, and others. In § 81 he lists those who err in excessu: a) Certain Church Fathers and Scholastics, who held that “philosophy at one time by itself justified the Greeks; for many are the ways to salvation’ (Clemens Alexandrinus). Thus also Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Epiphanius, Jerome, Chrysostom, etc. b) Certain Papists, such as Andradius and Erasmus, who held that Cicero is leading a quiet life among those in heaven. c) Some among the Calvinists, as, for instance, Zwingli, who placed “Numa, Aristides, Socrates, etc., among the blessed dwellers in heaven” (Expos. Fidei) and declared: “A heathen, if he nurses a pious mind within himself, is a Christian, even though he is ignorant of Christ.” (Vitus Winshemius: “Beware, my hearers, of the heaven of the Zwinglians: I should not like to live in that heaven; I should be afraid of the club of Hercules.”) d) The Photinians, who hold that the heathen could by nature reach the knowledge of things necessary unto salvation. The Racovian catechism (pp. 25–26) teaches that it is sufficient to salvation to know “that God is, that He is only one, that He is eternal, that He is perfectly just, that He is perfectly wise and perfectly powerful.”

8 Article I, Trigl., p, 103: “The First Article of Our Confession our adversaries approve, in which we declare that we believe and teach that there is one divine essence, undivided, etc., and yet that there are three distinct persons, of the same divine essence, and coeternal, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This article we have always taught and defended, and we believe that it has, in Holy Scripture, sure and firm testimonies that cannot be overthrown. And we constantly affirm that those thinking otherwise are outside of the Church of Christ, and are idolaters, and insult God.”

9 Cp. Opp. ν.a. IV, 470 ff.: “Disputatio theologica de mysterio sanctae trinitatis, of 1544, and “Disputationes duae de untiate essentiae divinae et de distinctione personarum in divinitate,” of 1545. The German translation: St. L. X:177 ff.

10 See especially Exposition of the Last Words of David, St. L. III:1884 ff.

11 The Koran says: “Believe in God and in His messenger [Jesus], but say nothing of the Triad. Avoid that, and you will be better off. There is only one God. Far be it from Him to have a son! … How can the Creator of heaven and earth have a son, since He has no wife?” (Quoted in Baier-Walther, I, 131.)

12 See further, in Vol. II, “The Personal Union and the Christological Theories of Modern Theology.”

13 John 5:32: “There is another () that beareth witness of Me; v. 37: “And the Father Himself, which hath sent Me, [He, ] hath borne witness of Me.”

14 There is no foundation for the claim of modern theologians that they have filled the term “person” with a richer meaning than the ancient Church was able to do. This will be discussed in chap. 8, B.

15 Both of these men attempted to harmonize the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity with human reason in the interest of apologetics. They imagined that what holds true of human persons: “Quot personae, tot essentiae,” must also be applied to the three Persons in the Godhead: “Quot personae divinae, tot essentiae divinae.” But certainly neither God’s actions nor His essence are subject to human reasoning. Scripture — and the Christian Church — teaches “tres personos et unam numero essentiam in divinitate.” — Roscellinus renounced his error at the Synod of Soissons, 1092. Roscellinus (a nominalist) was right in denying the objective existence of the genera and species; he erred in applying to the three Persons in the one God what was true of three human beings. (Cp. R. E., 2d ed., XVI, p. 47 ff.; XIII, p. 52 ff.

16 The Arminian Limborch is willing to grant that the divine essence belongs to the Son and the Holy Ghost, but he vitiates the Trinitarian doctrine by adding: “It is evident that with respect to these three persons a certain subordination obtains… . There is a certain superiority (supereminentia) of the Father over the Son, and of the Father and the Son over the Holy Ghost. It is more exalted to beget than to be begotten, to send than to proceed; the One who sends has power over the One that is sent, but not the One that is sent over Him who is sending.” Theol. Christ., II, 17, 25-26. Similarly the Arminian Episcopius, Inst. Theol, IV, 2, 32.

17 See Baier-Walther, II, 53 ff., for pointed quotations from Kahnis’ Dog matik and also from Hofmann’s Schriftbeweis. G. Stoeckhardt discusses the position of Modernist Lutherans in “Der moderne Subordinationismus im Licht der Schrift,” Lehre und Wehre, 40, 17-323 passim.

18 Treatise on Shem Hamphoras, St. L. XX:2057 ff. This treatise deserves to be read again and again. “… Now, as to the pretense of Jews that His name is unutterable, they do not know what they are babbling. If they refer to the letters, it cannot be true, for it is pronounced Jehovah. But if they do it to honor this name, then they ought to do it also in the case of all other names [of God] and let them also be too sacred to utter. Scripture indeed says that God’s essence, power, wisdom, benevolence, is unspeakable, immeasurable, infinite, incomprehensible, etc., not as though the letters or syllables were unutterable, but what those letters and syllables mean is beyond utterance… . God has no beginning or end, but is from eternity, in and of Himself, His name can never be ‘has been’ or ‘will be,’ but it must always be ‘Is,’ ‘Being,’ ‘Jehovah.’ … Hence, as His ‘Is,’ ‘Am,’ and ‘Being’ is incomprehensible, so it is also inexpressible, for no creature can comprehend that which is eternal… . In the Divine Being there is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three Persons in one eternal, incomprehensible being, or essence. Who will undertake to name, to fathom, fully to express, fully to describe such a marvelous being, or essence? … God is from eternity and is called three Persons.”

19 Cardinal Gibbons says that the worship of the Holy Ghost cannot be proved from Scripture, but has been established as doctrine through the traditions and the authority of the Pope. Faith of Our Fathers, p. 111.

20 Athanasian Creed, Trigl, 33, 25.

21 Quoted ad locum in Strack-Zoeckler’s Commentary.

22 G. Stoeckhardt in Lehre und Wehre, 40, 293 ff., shows that must refer to the immediately preceding “His Son, Jesus Christ.”

23 Arminians, modern Lutherans, and others.

24 Theses De untiate essentiae divinae et de distinctione personarum in divinitate, Opp. v. a., IV, 474; St. L. X:178.

25 Commenting on John 5:19, the old dogmaticians say correctly: “These words ascribe to the Son not impotence, but rather the identical divine majesty of the Father, because numerically the Father and the Son possess one and the same power and operation.”

26 Thus also Philippi, Hengstenberg, Keil, Noesgen, Luthardt, Stoeckhardt. Any other interpretation violates the text. Meusel (VI, p. 476) says that Meyer arrived at his Subordinationism by way of “exegesis.” “Exegesis” should be stricken out and “eisegesis” substituted. Meyer is here employing “dogmatical” exegesis, under the spell of which the prominent leaders of modern theology refuse to find the satisfactio vicaria and the inspiration of Scripture and the deity of Christ and the Trinity and the Christian doctrine of justification and the Christian doctrine of the Church taught in the clearest texts.

27 Philippi, Glavbenslehre, 3d ed., Vol. III, 191. Other theologians who take the same position are Hengstenberg, Keil, Thomasius, Rohnert. So also Joseph Addison Alexander, on Is. 63:9: “The old Christian doctrine is that the Angel of God’s presence was that Divine Being who is represented in the New Testament as the brightness of the Father’s glory and the express image of His Person, the image of God, in whose face the glory of God shines and in whom dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily… .” (Commentary on Isaiah, Vol. II, p. 394.)

28 In refuting the claim that the Old Testament does not teach the Trinity, our Lutheran dogmaticians agree with Luther in saying, on the one hand, that the Old Testament does not teach the doctrine of the Trinity as fully as the New Testament; but, on the other hand, they all agree with Quenstedt (I, 516) that Christ and the Apostles confuted the Jews by the testimonies from the Old Testament and set forth this mystery (of the Trinity) on the basis of the Old Testament writings (Matt. 22:46; Acts 18:24, 28) and that either the argument of Christ and the Apostles was sufficient and the Jews could be convinced from the writings of the Old Testament alone or Christ and the Apostles based their argument on an inadequate and untenable foundation, which would be an impious statement. And they agree with Kromayer: “It is surprising that not so many years ago some professed adherents of the Augustana challenged the statement that the Trinity is proved from the Old Testament. It certainly could not escape them that in the controversies with the Jews, who do not accept the New Testament, this doctrine was defended so conclusively from the Old Testament that until now it stands without successful contradiction,” (Theol. Po.-pol. I, 146.)

29 Two disputations concerning the unity of the essence and distinction of the Persons, St. L. X:178.

30 In his Commentary on Genesis (I:1150 f.) Luther reminds us that the Church Fathers employed inapt and at times very weak arguments to establish the doctrine of the Trinity and thereby gave occasion to the Jews to claim that our entire doctrine is false. “But,” says Luther, “after the doctrine of the Trinity has been established from clear words of Scripture, then it is permissible to explain and illustrate the doctrine with allegories and figures of speech. Augustine does not establish the doctrine of the Trinity on the fact that there are three powers in man (for example, memoria, intettigentia, voluntas). Nevertheless, it is a happy thought to seek reminders of the Trinity in man and in all creatures.”

31 Augustine attempted to “prove” the Trinity from God’s attribute of love. He argues that “there are not more than three Persons; if I love, then there must be three: I, the object of my love, and reciprocal love itself. Thus one sees the Trinity when one sees love.” De Trin. VIII, 8–10; IX, 2. This Augustinian “trinity of love” was further developed by the mystic-scholastic Richard of St. Victor. In more recent times Ernst Sartorius (d. 1859) popularized this theory (Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe I, 7 f.). Compare Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2d ed. II, 172.

32 Systema Theol., lib. 1, c. 3; quoted in Gerhard, Loci, locus “De Sanctissimo Mysterio Trinitatis,” § 27.

33 Cp. Quenstedt, 1, 554, Antithesis.

34 Philippi, op. cit., 181, calls attention to Twesten’s correct presentation, who says (Dogmatik I, 196) that it is hazardous to establish one’s faith on specious philosophical arguments. Such a procedure undermines the ground for true assurance and misleads men to accept hypotheses as evidence in matters of faith; it prompts men to assign a secondary position to the only foundation of Christian truth; and, finally, to doubt a doctrine which requires such dubious arguments for its support.

35 Cp. Nitzsch-Stephan, p. 432 ff.

36 See the chapter “The Personal Union and the Christological Theories of Modern Theology” in Vol. II.

37 Hase, Hutterus Redivivus, p. 180.

38 Glaubenslehre, 1921, p. 193.

39 Die christl. Lehre von der Rechtfertigung u. Versoehnung, 3d ed., II, 18.

40 See “Some Modern Theories of the Atonement Examined,” in Vol. II.

41 System der christl. Dogmatik, 1809, p. 128.

42 The history of the Athanasian Creed as well as of the other two ecumenical creeds is discussed by Bente, Trigl., “Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books,” p. 9 f.

43 Tertullian is credited with being the first to use this term. Cp. Zoeckler, Handbuch der theol. Wissenschaften, III, 88.

44 “Our Churches, with common consent, do teach that the decree of the Council of Nicaea concerning the Unity of the Divine Essence and concerning the Three Persons, is true and to be believed without any doubting; that is to say, there is one Divine Essence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost” (Augbsurg Confession I. Trigl. 43).

45 Dogmaticians have defined person also as suppositum intelligens (a thinking self-existing being), substantia individua intelligens incommunicabile.

46 Grundwahrheiten, 5th ed., p. 115.

47 The difficulties arising from the inadequacy of human language became apparent in the discussions between the Eastern and the Western Church Fathers. The Greek Fathers objected to the Latins’ use of persona, because in its basic meaning this Latin word denotes the mask, role, character of an actor, and it was alleged that when applied to the Trinity, it fails to express the real distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The Latins countered that the Greeks’ term hypostasis means an essence, and that its use in the doctrine of the Trinity makes of the three hypostases three essences. After many conferences it was agreed that the Greeks should use the term persona, and the Latins the term hypostasis. See Baier, Vol. II, p. 57. Cp. Augustine, De Tr., Vol. VII, 4. Chemnitz summarizes the salient points of this doctrine, op. cit., 38.

48 Contra Arianos III, 4. See Seeberg, Dogmengesch., 2d ed., I, 166.

49 Glaubenslehre, 1921, p. 192.

50 The Filioque became one of the points which caused the schism between the Eastern and the Western Churches. In the Orthodox Confession of 1643, p. 142, we read: “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone as the Foundation and Source of the Godhead” (Quoted in Plitt, Grundriss der Symbolik, 3d ed., p. 40). — The fact is, of course, that the Filioque in substance was taught in the public writings before 589. Augustine taught it. See Seeberg, op. cit., I, 195. Cp. also Baier, II, 69, quoting Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8:9; 1 Pet. 1:11; John 20:22; Is. 11:4, compared with 2 Thess. 2:8. The Scripture proof ought to mean something to those modern theologians who admit that the economic (historical) divine acts presuppose eternal (“vorzeitliche”) or ontological relations in God. The Eastern Churches would hardly have denied the Filioque so tenaciously if they had not sought for a reason to separate from the Western Church.

51 Quenstedt: “An inevitable result of the one essence is the mutual interpenetration and immanence by which because of the unity of essence the one Person is in a most peculiar manner in the other, John 14:11; 17:21” (I, 470).

52 Horst Stephan: “To this were added the ancient speculations concerning the opera ad intra (the two sets of personal acts, namely, the generation proceeding from the Father, and the spiration proceeding from the Father and the Son) which result in three personal properties (paternity, filiation, procession) and in the equally meaningless phrase notiones personales. In this way the ancient Church arrived at a very artificial theory.” (Glaubenslehre, 1921, p. 193.)

53 Trigl., p. 33. — Baier-Walther, II, 64: Distinguuntur personae divinae actibus personalibus, proprietatibus et notionibus personalibus. Loeber, Ev.-Luth. Dogm., 1872, p. 201, explains the ecclesiastical terms personal acts (Wirkungen), attributes (Eigenschaften), and marks of recognition (Kenntnisse).

54 Thus Luther repudiated the theories of an economic Trinity, as successive revelation of God in three different persons, which is, of course, only another name for Unitarianism.

55 Today the devil does more than merely “switch his tail.” During one period of the Arian controversy it was said that the world had become Arian. Today it can be said that the so-called Protestant world has become Unitarian. See Nitzsch-Stephan, op. cit., p. 490 ff.

56 See Horst Stephan, Ghubenslehre, 1921, p. 193.

57 Chemnitz presents the same views. (Loci I, 42 sq.) Among other things he says: “The Persons are distinct not only in their ‘inner distinctions,’ but also by their works to the outside, for while in the works ad extra the three Persons work jointly, nevertheless, the personal property of each Person must be observed. The three works of the Trinity according to Rom. 11:36 (of Him, through Him, to Him) are indivisible, for St. Paul does not add, ‘To them be glory,’ but, ‘To whom be glory,’ ” Chemnitz summarizes as follows: We believe the unity of the essence and allow for no confusion of the Persons. The rule that the works ad extra are common to the three Persons must be understood so that the distinctions and properties of the Persons are not confounded. This rule must be observed especially in our worship, for while the divine worship is indivisible, the Christian prayer differs fundamentally from all non-Christian prayers inasmuch as the Christian does not invoke the three Persons indiscriminately (confuse), but he is aware of the particular distinctions and blessings of each Person.

58 Quenstedt (I, 577) employs the same line of argument against the Socinians. Incidentally, Quenstedt also anticipates and refutes Luthardt, who in Zoeckler’s Commentary on John 15:26 uses virtually the same arguments which the Socinians had employed at Quenstedt’s time. Luthardt says: “The ancient Church understood this passage of the eternal procession; in fact, the Eastern Church used this passage in its opposition to the Filioque of the Western Church. However, the context [?] and the preposition (from near by), not (from within) compel us to understand the procession as a historical and temporal one.” Quenstedt’s refutation of the Socinian error is therefore applicable to Luthardt. He writes: “My answer is: 1) does not exclude of origin; 2) the Son is also called the Only-Begotten of () the Father by generation (John 1:14). In this mystery and are synonymous terms.”

59 Our dogmaticians express it thus: “By the term ‘divine essence’ that is understood which is conceived as being the first in God and which according to our mode of conception is the principium and radix of all perfections which are ascribed to God after the manner of attributes” (Baier, II, 11).

60 Loci, locus “De Natura Dei,” § 51 (Ed. Frankf. and Hamburg, 1657, I, 59).

61 Geschichte d. protest. Theologie, p. 563 f.

62 Quenstedt, I, 422 sq.: “Essence, substance, spirit, and the remaining attributes which are ascribed alike to God and to creatures, cannot be predicated of God and the rational creatures in the same manner (, univoce) nor in an equivocal sense (, aequivoce), but only in an analogous way (, analogice), that is, they apply to God primarily () and absolutely, to the creatures in a secondary and derived manner… . In its proper and strict meaning, univoce is used when the things share fully both the name and the matter which is denoted by the name and when there is no inequality due to a dependence of the one upon the other. Things are said to agree aequivoce when they share the name, but not the matter which is designated by the name. We use the term analogice when things have both the name and the matter in common; however, in an unequal degree, the one having the name and the matter in a primary and absolute way, the other in a secondary and derived (per depenaentiam) manner.” In his antithetical section (op. cit., 423) Quenstedt lists: 1) The Scotists and some nominalists, as Occam and Biel, who held that being, essence, spirit, etc., must be predicated of man and of God univocally. 2) Certain Scholastics, Keckermann and others, declared that essence, substance, spirit, can be ascribed to both God and rational creatures only equivocally. This means that in reality essence, etc., is not ascribed to the creatures at all. Thomas Aquinas (P. I, q. 13, Art. 5) shows that if essence and attributes are ascribed to God and the creatures only equivocally, then it is impossible to learn anything concerning God from nature. This is contrary to philosophy, which has proved many things concerning God demonstrative, and also contradicts St. Paul (Rom. 1:17-18). Quenstedt also shows that the idea of equivocation is absurd: “1) If the creatures share only in the name, but not in the reality of essence, they would be nonentities. Who would assert that God created mere nonentities? 2) If the creature were no more than a nonentity, how could it owe its existence as a dependent being to God? 3) In assuming the human nature, Christ would have assumed a nonentity.” In the interest of their wrong Christology some Calvinists have asserted that the attributes in God are nonentities. Since God cannot communicate attributes which He does not possess, they could deny the communication of divine attributes to the human nature in Christ, op. cit., p. 427.

63 Let the vocalization of be what it may, on the meaning there can be no doubt, since God Himself has explained it etymologically and essentially (Ex. 3:14) as “Pure Being.”

64 Handbuch der theolog. Wissenschaften III, 85 f. Zoeckler lists such works as Raym. Lull, De centum nominibus Dei; Goerres, Christliche Mystik, who enumerates the 150 names with which St. Rosa of Lima addressed God; J. Blueher, Die 100 biblischen Namen unsres Herrn Jesu Christi (1870); the Spaniard Luis de Leon’s three Books of the Name of Christ (Salamanca, 1583); Edwin Arnold, Pearls of the Faith, or Islam’s Rosary (1882), where the 550 names of Allah are listed, 99 of which are said to be the sweetest and recited according to the 99 pearls of the rosary.

65 Modern German theologians use the terms “Weitabgezogenheit” and “Weltbezogenheitr

66 Quenstedt, I, 409: There are two classes of attributes: 1) Those which describe the divine essence viewed in its absoluteness (absolute) and by itself (in se) without any regard to any activity. These are called immanent, nonoperative, quiescent, i. e., they do not concern themselves with certain acts of God. They are, e. g., immensity, eternity, spirituality. 2) Those which describe the divine essence in relation to an act of God (relative), or are operative, have an external effect and are directed toward certain operations, such as might, knowledge, justice, mercy.

67 Cp. Baier, II, 16, for this type of classification.

68 Nitzsch-Stephan, op. cit., p. 452, describes the position of outstanding German theologians.

69 Chemnitz, Loci, I, 28.

70 Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 2d ed., I, 49 ff. For further details on kenobcism see “The Person of Christ.”

71 The inadequacy of an absolute classification is evident in Quenstedt’s definition. He divides the attributes into immanent and transitive and says that the immanent attributes have no relation to Cod’s acts. But this is not true of immensity, the first in his list of the immanent attributes. God’s immensity becomes active, if not directly, at least indirectly, in the transitive attributes. This is also indicated in Aug. Conf., Art. I, which speaks of God’s infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. — See the chapter “All Divine Attributes are Communicated to the Human Nature” in Vol. II.

72 Luther: “If the Anthropomorphites [a Syrian sect of the fourth century which ascribed a body to God] really entertained such crass opinions, they were justly condemned… . It seems to me, however, that they only endeavored to present the doctrines in a simple manner to the common people. For in His being, God is unknowable and inexpressible. We are at our wits’ end when we try to define God.” (St. L. 1:487.)

73 See the quotation in Baier-Walther, II, 18-19. The theosophists have the pantheistic conception of the emanation of the world from the essence of God.

74 Gerhard answers this twofold objection as follows: In the creation two things must be considered: 1) the source of action; 2) the resultant effect. The source of action is the Divine Essence itself, which experiences no change by the creation, because in the creation God carried out in time what He had decreed from eternity in His immutable will. A change took place only in the resultant effect, a change from non-existence to existence, but there was no change whatsoever in God. — The same answer must be given to the question whether the work of incarnation made God changeable. Socinus answers affirmatively: ‘If God truly became incarnate in the moment when Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary and born of her, who then can deny that something adventitious and new, and that of the most important significance, was added to God Himself and to His being?’ (Defensio animad. Posn., p. 66). But there remains the same Person, though it began to be the Person of another [besides His divine] nature. Loci, locus “De Nat. Dei,” § 154.

75 This is probably the loftiest statement that has been written since the days of the Apostles on God’s omnipresence.

76 For details see “The Person of Christ.”

77 Col. 2:11-12; Matt. 28:19; Matt. 26:26-28 (blood of the new covenant).

78 The good angels belong to the eternal heavenly family, Heb. 12:22-24; Eph. 1:21. The eternal fire is prepared primo loco for the devil and his angels, Matt. 25:41.

79 Baier: “The eternity of God, absolutely and strictly speaking, denotes the permanent existence and duration of God without beginning, without end, without any succession or alternation (op. cit., II, 27).

80 Gerhard: “O soul, created for eternity, slough of the love for mundane and transitory things. Put your affections on the heavenly things, for they are eternal… . The world passes away, the earth perishes, all things in it are subject to perdition. But worse is the perdition of him who attaches his heart to the earthly and transitory things.” (Op. cit., § 149.)

81 Hollaz: “Though the devil frightens us and the world oppresses us, we lift our hearts in the hope of eternal glory. ‘Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal,’ 2 Cor. 4:17-18.” (Examen, cap. I, “De Deo,” qu. 50.)

82 The Latin terms, especially scientia de futuribili, scientia media, to describe the divine knowledge of contingent or possible things, may not sound so well. But to challenge the fact itself reveals not wisdom, but opposition to the clear Scripture passages.

83 Such as Cicero. — See Gerhard, op. cit., ¶248.

84 Socinus, Prael. Theol., c. 8–11: “No argument nor Scripture testimony can be adduced from which it can be clearly gathered that even before they were committed God knew the wicked deeds which came solely from the will of men.”

85 Nitzsch-Stephan, p. 459 f., discusses and dissents from the views of the Socinians and such modern theologians as Rothe and Weisse.

86 For further details see the “Eternal Election” in Vol. III.

87 For further details see “Divine Providence” and “Eternal Election.”

88 This was the view of Luther and other dogmaticians. Commenting on 1 Pet. 3:19-20, Luther says: “We are unable here on earth to view this life in one glance, because it unfolds step by step until the Last Day. In God’s sight, however, our life is a moment, for with Him a thousand years are as one day.” “Therefore,” says Luther, “we cannot comprehend this life [with God and before God]. We view things lengthwise, but God views them crosswise.” (St. L. IX: 1245.) Gerhard: “Prescience is ascribed to God for our sake. To God the things which lie in the future from our viewpoint are present.” (Op. cit., § 243.) John Adam Osiander: “As there is no ‘postscience’ (knowledge of the past] in God, though He knows the past, so, strictly speaking, no prescience can be predicated of God by which He knows the future.” Colleg. Theol. I, 290. While God graciously condescends to our finite modes of comprehension and divides His knowledge according to our concept of time, He is nevertheless at the same time exalted above space and time, for in His presence a thousand years are as yesterday (Ps. 90:4). God will therefore not permit us to transfer the division of His knowledge to His essence. Gerhard: “The divine knowledge does not dwell in God by means of (per modum) an aptitude added to His essence, but it must be ascribed to God as an absolutely unconditioned act (actus purissimus). By one simple act of understanding and in one single moment He perceives all things.” (Loc. cit.)

89 2 Chron. 2:7: Solomon requested Hiram to send a man cunning () to work in gold, etc.

90 See “Some Modern Theories of the Atonement Examined” in Vol. II.

91 The dogmatical statements, though inadequate, express the Scriptural truths that in God cause and effect are not two essentially (formaliter) different things, because there is nothing outside God which can cause something in the absolute God. But since we must progress in our thinking from cause to effect, Scripture permits us to view the effect as actually caused (virtualiter) by a preceding cause. Many theologians insist that we must not speak of a “change in the mind and disposition of God.” See Vol. II, p. 367, Note 69.

92 Karl Hase, Eν. Dogmatik, 3d ed., p. 295.

93 Cp. Vol. II, p. 34–49.

94 This fact is brought out also in Nitzsch-Stephan, p. 399.

95 The teaching of modern theologians on the holiness of God is summarized and reviewed in Ed. Koenig, Theologie des Alten Testaments, kritisch u. vergleichend zusammengestellt, 1922, p. 171 ff.

96 “Gott gibt das Gesetz aus, aber er nimmt es nicht wieder hinauf.” Luther’s sermon on Ex. 9:16, St. L. III:811 ff. Luther points out that whoever makes God subject to the law of “a universal concept of good,” loses God, destroys the concept of God, reduces God to an idol. The universal concept of good is subject to God. “A man is pious when he acts and lives according to the Law. In God’s case you must invert the order: An act is good because God performs it… . Do not dare to apply a law or a standard to God, for He is not a creature; He is immeasurable. Man must live according to a norm… . Since God has no law, standard, or limit, He cannot transgress them.” Prov. 16:4: “The Lord hath made all things for Himself,” i. e., according to His own pattern. — “Exlex” by the way, is not “church Latin,” but is found in “classical” Latin, as any larger Latin lexicon will show.

97 Deus producit volendo. Thus also Nitzsch-Stephan, op. cit., p. 456.

98 Cp. Luther, St. L. XI:957 (“If it is necessary”); Walther, Pastorale, p. 294 [Fritz, Pastoral Theology, 1945, p. 210].

99 Sunt sophismata, quibus definitio rei tollitur. Some dogmaticians have refuted the objection in detail. Scherzer, Systema, p. 55: “If God were to lie, to die, to sin, He would not be God. If the creature had infinite perfection, it would not be a creature. If yesterday had not passed away, it would not be yesterday; if tomorrow existed today, there would be no today.”

100 Nitzsch-Stephan, 472 ff., correctly calls attention to this advisability.

101 Baier: “Goodness belongs to God absolutely and essentially (absolute et in se) and is therefore God’s perfection itself or His essence, in so far as His goodness comprises all divine perfections.” The only difference between perfection and goodness is that the former is viewed only as a remote attribute, while the latter is both remote and relative. Campend. II, 44.

102 Quenstedt, Systema, I, 418.

103 A detailed discussion of the attributes of mercy, love, etc., in their unity and divergence will be offered under the heading “Concept of Saving Grace” in Vol. II.

104 See “The Papacy and the Doctrine of Justification” in Vol. II.

105 “Modern Protestant Theology and the Doctrine of Justification” in Vol. II.

106 See “The Denial of the Means of Grace in the Personal Life of the Christians” in Vol. III.

The Creation of the World and of Man

(DE CREATIONE)